@Jason Answering more directly: all of the success metrics in the certificate description, except those explicitly called out as not being attributable to AI Safety Tokyo, are fairly attributable to my work (number of sessions run, number of new HEAs, existence of TAIS 2024, etc).

@Jason I guess it's the job of the oracular funder to deduce how much of the impact is attributable to my work? And the job of investors to guess what conclusion the funder will come to and buy shares based on that? This credit assignment problem exists for all impact markets; if a research team funded by an impact market creates a new kind of cheap lab grown meat, and at the same time another team lobbies for animal right laws that make traditional meat more expensive, who is responsible for lowering meat consumption? How much of the decrease is attributable to the impact certificate funded team?

@Chris-Lakin I agree that this certificate is not a great fit for the manifund model; I submitted this as an ACX grant and ticked the box because why not. Here, investors are betting purely on whether or not a retroactive funder will buy the certificate from them at a markup, not predicting whether the project will be successful. I guess investors might also be acting as retroactive funders themselves. I tried to minimize the double-funding problem by retaining as much of the equity as Manifund allows (99%). I set the minimum valuation such that the Manifund interface showed the value of the certificate as being equal to the going rate for group organizers given by OpenPhil and CEA, but I don't know much about how Manifund works. Should I instead have released 100% of the shares to the market and set the minimum valuation as low as possible?