Introduction & Background

Disease knows no borders. In less than 36 hours, an outbreak can travel from a remote community to major cities across continents causing preventable deaths, illness and serious economic disruption. Liberia (West Africa) has experienced this reality directly. The Ebola epidemic (2014–2016) severely tested the country’s health system and demonstrated how critical safe laboratory capacity is for rapid diagnosis and outbreak control. More recently, the resurgence of mpox across Africa and Liberia’s reported increase in confirmed cases—has again reinforced a simple lesson: preparedness must be strengthened before the next emergency, particularly where health systems are fragile and resources are constrained.

In this context, biosafety and biosecurity are not technical add-ons; they are essential foundations of epidemic preparedness and response. Biosafety protects laboratory staff and communities from accidental exposure during the handling of infectious specimens. Biosecurity prevents the loss, theft, or misuse of hazardous pathogens and ensures accountability for high-risk materials. When these systems are weak, outbreaks can be amplified through delayed diagnosis, unsafe specimen handling, breakdowns in waste and decontamination systems, and poor control of dangerous agents. Reflecting these risks, the World Health Organization (WHO)-led Joint External Evaluation (JEE) 2023 of Liberia’s International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) core capacities rated Liberia’s biosafety and biosecurity indicators—P7.1 (structural and policy landscape) and P7.2 (training and practices) as 1 (“no capacity”), and highlighted substantial disparities across sectors, with critical gaps beyond the human health domain. In plain language, Liberia still lacks many of the basic “rules and routines” needed to keep laboratory work consistently safe and secure: there is no enforceable legal framework to license laboratories and enforce minimum standards; there is limited national visibility on where higher-risk pathogens are held and how they are controlled across sectors; and while One Health coordination structures exist, biosafety and biosecurity practices are not consistently implemented in animal and environmental laboratory systems. Training has begun especially in human health but day-to-day safety also depends on reliable basics such as PPE (personal protective equipment) supplies, functioning biosafety cabinets, and routine maintenance and calibration, which are not consistently assured. As a result, progress remains fragile when training and equipment upkeep are donor-dependent and not fully embedded in routine national systems for budgeting, oversight, and continuous improvement.

This seed-funded, 6-month scoping project is designed to generate a practical, nationally owned pathway for strengthening biosafety and biosecurity in Liberia using the Biosafety and Biosecurity Landscape Assessment Matrix (BLAM). It will produce the evidence and consensus needed to move from “problem recognition” to an investable plan for a larger implementation phase. The work will be led and aligned through NPHIL (National Public Health Institute of Liberia) and the MoH (Ministry of Health), and endorsed through NEPC (National Epidemic Preparedness Committee) a high-level decision-making forum chaired by national leadership and represented by key stakeholders and partners.

Project approach

·       Decentralized: BLAM will be applied beyond Monrovia, capturing the realities of county and regional laboratories and referral pathways—not only the national level.

·       Democratic: priorities will be co-defined with laboratories, NPHIL/MoH, and partners, and endorsed through NEPC to strengthen ownership and follow-through.

·       Differential: findings will be risk-based and tier-specific, avoiding one-size-fits-all recommendations and focusing future investment where risk is highest.

·       Defensive: the project accelerates preparedness actions that reduce outbreak amplification risk before the next emergency occurs.

Goal

To generate a nationally endorsed, evidence-based pathway for strengthening biosafety and biosecurity in Liberia aligned with IHR (2005) and JEE 2023 priorities, by conducting a rapid scoping assessment using BLAM and translating findings into a funder-ready plan for full-scale implementation.

Objectives

·       Establish a scoping baseline: Apply BLAM to identify and prioritize biosafety and biosecurity gaps across key laboratory tiers and referral pathways (national and subnational).

·       Clarify the governance and legislation pathway: Map existing policies, draft instruments, and institutional responsibilities, and outline feasible options for strengthening legislation/regulation and oversight.

·       Secure high-level alignment: Engage NPHIL, MoH, and the NEPC to validate findings, endorse national priorities, and coordinate partners around a shared direction.

·       Define “what to do next” and “what it will cost”: Identify practical, risk-based strengthening options and develop an investable, phased implementation plan (12–24 months) with indicative cost bands and partner roles.

·       Initiate foundational capacity development: Deliver a short orientation and needs assessment for NPHRL (Monrovia) staff and FETP cohorts on risk-based biosafety/biosecurity and safe outbreak operations, to inform scale-up.

Key Activities

1) Start-up and coordination

·       Establish a BLAM Seed Task Team (NPHIL/MoH, NPHRL, FETP, NEPC secretariat focal point, selected partners).

·       Confirm scope, facility sample, and methods; align expectations for outputs and use of results.

·       Prepare and deliver an NEPC launch briefing.

2) Rapid BLAM scoping assessment

·       Apply BLAM in a small, representative sample of laboratories and functions (e.g., NPHRL + selected county/regional labs; include an animal/environment interface where feasible).

·       Conduct targeted data collection through:

·       brief desk review (policies, plans, SOPs, maintenance records)

·       key informant discussions (leadership, lab managers, biosafety focal persons, partners)

3) Policy/legislation and institutional mapping

·       Map the current legal and policy landscape, decision authorities, and enforcement mechanisms.

·       Identify gaps and feasible pathways (short-term directives/SOPs vs longer-term legislation and regulations).

·       Define priority “minimum standards” needed for implementation readiness.

4) Validation and endorsement

·       Hold a technical validation session with key stakeholders to confirm findings and refine priorities.

·       Deliver an NEPC endorsement briefing to agree the priority agenda and partner coordination actions.

Deliverables

·       BLAM Liberia Scoping Baseline Report containing prioritized gaps by tier and risk, key bottlenecks (laws, oversight, maintenance, workforce, referral practices), “no-regrets” actions that can start immediately

·       NEPC-Endorsed Priority Decision with nationally agreed priorities and sequencing partner coordination actions and accountability milestones

·       Policy/Legislation Scoping Brief: what exists, what is missing, and a feasible pathway for strengthening oversight and enforceable standards

·       Proposed 12–24 month implementation phase, cost bands, workstreams and results framework

Outcomes

·       A clear national picture of biosafety and biosecurity gaps and risks across laboratory tiers and referral pathways.

·       High-level endorsement and partner alignment through NEPC, supporting coordinated action rather than fragmented activities.

·       A feasible, Liberia-owned pathway for strengthening legislation/regulation and oversight.

Impact

This seed project lays the foundation for a larger implementation phase that can deliver:

·       enforceable standards and functional oversight for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity

·       improved workforce competency, routine supervision, and certification/maintenance systems

·       stronger IHR/JEE performance and improved national and regional health security